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Abstract. In many capacity-intensive industries (e.g. electricity, band-
width), exchanges allow ﬁrms to buy and sell wholesale capacity before sell-
ing on the retail market. This allows ﬁrms to smooth demand shocks, but it
also raises suspicions that exchanges facilitate tacit collusion to limit capac-
ity investment. This paper models investment and exchange in a one-shot
game and in a repeated game with tacit collusion. It ﬁnds that the presence
of the exchange does not reduce total capacity investment, and thus does
not raise consumer prices. In fact, the exchange may make it more diﬃcult
to sustain tacit collusion.
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exchanges; tacit collusion.
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1Tacit Collusion in Capacity Investment:
The Role of Capacity Exchanges
1 Introduction
In many industries where capacity constraints are important, such as energy
and telecommunications, ﬁrms can trade capacity in an exchange. These
exchanges are modeled on commodities exchanges for products like oil and
soybeans, but they are focused on trades between potentially competing
ﬁrms.1 This paper examines how capacity exchanges aﬀect the potential for
an oligopolistic industry to tacitly collude on the initial capacity investment.
It is important to distinguish between intermediate good exchanges,
which are two-sided markets that connect customers with suppliers, and ca-
pacity exchanges, which are essentially one-sided markets where ﬁrms trade
with one another. As an example, Kwoka (2001) studied exchanges in the
automobile industry and noted that “The competitive concerns over B2B
exchanges fall into two broad categories – those involving the ﬁnal output of
the exchange participants (for example, cars) and those involving the prod-
ucts transacted on the exchanges themselves (e.g., wiring or tires)” (pg. 66).
1Some trades have been misused in accounting frauds (e.g. ENRON and Global Cross-
ing), but the legitimate beneﬁts are suﬃcient that exchanges will continue to be important.
2In commodity infrastructure markets like electricity or telecommunications
bandwidth, these are close to one and the same.
Lucking-Reiley and Spulber (2001) surveyed business-to-business exchanges
of both types and note that they can enhance eﬃciency but also raise an-
titrust concerns, in particular the possibility of tacit collusion. The concern
is echoed by K¨ uhn (2001) who proposes that exchanges should only make
available aggregate data (as indeed they do in our model).
There are two distinct routes by which the introduction of a capacity
exchange can aﬀect tacit collusion. The ﬁrst is that the exchange may alter
the information structure of the game ﬁrms play. Imperfect information
about other ﬁrms’ actions means that cooperative actions could be mistaken
for defections, and price wars could result (Green and Porter 1982). A
capacity exchange might be one of a number of ways to improve information
and thus facilitate tacit collusion (K¨ uhn 2001). Similarly, an exchange could
be used as a means of punishment in the event of defection. For example, a
simple punishment strategy would just bar a defecting ﬁrm from using the
exchange.
The other route by which a capacity exchange could aﬀect tacit collu-
sion is uncertainty over the demand for capacity. Uncertainty implies that
investment can be ex post ineﬃcient, and a capacity exchange will therefore
3alter the payoﬀ structure of the game – in particular it alters the defection
payoﬀ in a tacit collusion arrangement. This eﬀect is the focus of this paper.
We consider industries where a small number of ﬁrms make long-lived
investments in capacity. Firms thus choose quantities ` a la Cournot, and as
in the standard Cournot model the entire quantity is sold at the market-
clearing price. After the capacity commitments are made, there are random
shocks to retail demand; thus, ﬁrms have too much or too little capacity
relative to the ex post Cournot optimum.
In this environment, a capacity exchange is only desirable if the ﬁrms
have diﬀerentiated retail demand curves and at least partially uncorrelated
demand shocks. Otherwise, the total quantity would simply be sold at the
price the market would bear, and no amount of capacity trading would
change that price. Thus, we model goods which are perfect substitutes
from the ﬁrms’ point of view, but imperfect substitutes from the point of
view of retail consumers. For example, in markets like telecommunications
and electricity, bandwidth and megawatts are homogeneous in the wholesale
market, but they are bundled with associated services and sold in multiple,
overlapping retail markets subject to diverse demand shocks.
With a capacity exchange, ﬁrms with more demand can buy extra capac-
ity from those with less demand. This allows all ﬁrms to sell an amount that
4is closer to their optimal quantity in the retail market. Under the Cournot
assumption that retail prices adjust to clear the market, this eﬀect raises
proﬁts but not the expected price, so social surplus unambiguously rises.2
In a repeated game, the ﬁrms can tacitly collude to reduce total capacity
even without an exchange. Adding the exchange actually increases the in-
centive to defect, so that it is more diﬃcult to sustain tacit collusion with
the exchange than without it. We believe this is a novel result that needs
to be weighed against the information eﬀects mentioned above.3
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model. In
section 3, we apply that model in a static setting without an exchange and
then add the exchange in section 4. In section 5 we move to the repeated
game setting, and we conclude in section 6.
2If demand shocks were correlated across ﬁrms (e.g. a general recession or widespread
hot weather), all ﬁrms would have either excess demand or supply, and trading could not
improve the outcome.
3Somewhat comparable results by Maksimovic (1988) and Stenbacka (1994) show that
ﬁrms with higher debt-equity ratios have more diﬃculty sustaining tacit collusion and
that ﬁrms may choose less debt to avoid this problem. In their setting, debt raises the
defection payoﬀ just as the exchange does in this paper.
52 Model
There are N ﬁrms, indexed by j = 1,...,N, each producing a single good.
Retail demand for each ﬁrm’s good is linear:
pj = α − βqj − γ
N X
i=1
qi + j (1)
where pj is the retail price per unit and qj is the quantity made available
by ﬁrm j. Parameters β and γ indicate that retail price responds to a
ﬁrm’s own quantity and to the total quantity in the market. Thus β = 0
represents the conventional linear Cournot setup, while γ = 0 represents
monopoly. Demand also includes a random shock, j, with expected value
0 and variance σ2. The shocks are ﬁrm-speciﬁc and are independent and
identically distributed.4
Firms play a three-stage game:
Stage 1: Capacity Investment Each ﬁrm chooses to build capacity kj.
Let all ﬁrms have identical constant marginal cost of capacity c.
Stage 2: Capacity Trading Each ﬁrm learns the realization of its j and
then chooses a quantity δj that it will trade in the exchange. If δj < 0,
ﬁrm j sells capacity into the exchange; if δj > 0, ﬁrm j buys addi-
tional capacity. The price at which capacity is bought and sold is
4We assume that the support of j is suﬃciently bounded to prevent negative prices.
6determined in the exchange and is denoted s. Firms are price-takers
in the exchange.5
Stage 3: Retail Sales In the third stage, the quantity that ﬁrm j sells to
retail consumers is qj = kj + δj with pj given by (1).6
The next three sections analyze the game under increasingly complex
conditions. We ﬁrst examine a benchmark with no exchange. Next, we
consider ﬁrms that trade in an exchange in one period only. Finally, we
extend the model to a repeated game.
3 Competition Without a Capacity Exchange
Consider a benchmark case in which there is no exchange, i.e. δj = 0 ∀j.
We solve the game backwards to ﬁnd a subgame perfect equilibrium. By
stage 3, each ﬁrm has chosen its kj. The proﬁt of ﬁrm j is
Πj =
 





kj − ckj (2)
There is no stage 2, since there is no exchange. In stage 1, ﬁrm j chooses
kj. However, the value of j has not yet been realized, so ﬁrm j must
5We discuss relaxing this assumption in Section 6.
6There is no strategic decision in “stage” 3, so it is not properly a subgame, but it is
easier to describe the model if we separate retail sales from the wholesale trading market.
Thus we slightly abuse game theory terminology and call this a three-stage game.
7maximize the expected value of Πj. Solving simultaneously for all ﬁrms
gives the Cournot equilibrium quantity:
kNT =
α − c
2β + γ + γN
where the superscript NT denotes “No Trading.” The ﬁrm’s expected proﬁt
based on this optimal investment is
E(ΠNT) = (α − (β + γN)kNT)kNT − ckNT (3)
These are just the familiar Cournot results using the β and γ notation.
4 Competition With a Capacity Exchange
Now introduce trading into the one-shot game. Since ﬁrms have symmetric
costs, the only incentive to trade is to smooth demand shocks.
4.1 Stage 3 Retail Sales
In stage 3, both kj and δj are given. The quantity that ﬁrm j sells to retail
consumers is kj + δj and the price it charges is
pj = α − β(kj + δj) − γ
N X
i=1
(ki + δi) + j (4)
The ﬁrm’s retail revenue is Rj = pj(ki + δi)
84.2 Stage 2 Capacity Trading
By stage 2, capacity kj is set, but ﬁrm j can choose δj, the amount of
capacity that it buys or sells. The ﬁrm maximizes its operating proﬁt from
stage 3 retail sales minus trading costs:
max
δj
πj = Rj − sδj (5)
where s is the price of capacity in the capacity exchange. We assume that
the ﬁrms all behave as price takers with regard to trading. That is, they do
not expect that their trades will inﬂuence s.7
Since no new capacity can be built during stage 2,
PN
i=1 ki remains un-
changed despite the trading. The ﬁrst order condition for (5) is ﬁrm j’s




i=1 ki + j − s
2β
− kj (6)
The total amount of capacity sold in the trading market must equal
the total amount purchased. The market clears if
PN
i=1 δi = 0. Combin-
ing the market clearing condition with the trading curves of each ﬁrm, the
equilibrium price is:









Finding the equilibrium quantities in the trading market is diﬃcult, pri-
marily because of very tedious algebra. The following proposition gives re-
sults that apply to this model and a range of similar linear-demand oligopoly
models:
Proposition 1 Let ﬁrm j have trading curve δj(s) = Aj +Bjj +Djs−kj
and let this ﬁrm sell its output at retail price pj = Fj +Gjj +Hj(kj +δj)+
Lj
PN
i=1 ki. Let demand shocks 1,...,N be i.i.d. random variables with
mean 0 and variance σ2. If all ﬁrms behave as price takers in the capacity
exchange, then the quantity traded by ﬁrm j is
δj(s∗) = ˆ Aj + Bjj − Dj
N X
i=1
ˆ Dii − kj
and the expected operating proﬁt of ﬁrm j (net of trading costs) is
E(πj) = ˜ Aj + ˜ Bjσ2
where the coeﬃcients ˆ Aj, ˜ Aj, etc. are deﬁned in the proof and are functions
of the capacities, ki, and the parameters only.
The proof of Proposition 1 and all subsequent propositions are given in
the Appendix. Applying the proposition to the Cournot case of (4) and (6)
10gives equilibrium capacity trade for ﬁrm j:






N . Firms with below-average capacity or above-average
demand will buy more in the capacity exchange. Under trading, a ﬁrm’s
retail quantity supplied and retail price charged depend on its own physical
capacity only insofar as its own capacity aﬀects the total amount of capacity
installed by all ﬁrms. This shows how capacity trading smooths outcomes
relative to the no-trading case.
The expected operating proﬁt of ﬁrm j is




The intuition behind (7) is that trading has three eﬀects. First, the ﬁrm
trades, on average, to the industry average capacity, so a ﬁrm’s own retail
price is determined entirely by the industry average rather than its own
quantity. Second, there is a beneﬁt or cost to having capacity diﬀerent from
the industry average (but this eﬀect disappears in the symmetric equilibrium
we will discuss below). Third, there is a constant beneﬁt from smoothing
the random shocks which is proportional to the variance of the shocks.
114.3 Stage 1 Capacity Investment
In Stage 1, ﬁrms anticipate the capacity trading equilibrium of stage 2, and
therefore they anticipate operating proﬁts E(πj). Each ﬁrm maximizes net
proﬁt E(Πj) = E(πj) − ckj by choosing kj. We employ the usual Cournot
assumption that each ﬁrm takes all of the other ﬁrms’ capacities as ﬁxed.
The ﬁrst order condition is
dE(Πj)
dkj










In equilibrium, all of the ﬁrms solve this condition. Solving simultaneously,
the equilibrium capacity choice is:
kT =
α − c
2β + γ + γN
= kNT
where superscript “T” stands for trading. Trading does not change the level
of capacity investment from the no-trading case. Substituting this level of
capacity investment into the expected proﬁt gives:
E(ΠT





Capacity trading allows ﬁrms to handle demand shocks better, thus in-
creasing proﬁts. The gains are greater when the variance of the random
shock is higher. Since N−1
N is concave, most of the gains from capacity
trading come with just a few ﬁrms participating.
12The size of the increased proﬁts does not depend on how vigorous down-
stream competition is (i.e. how large γ is). In this model, trading is not a
mechanism to increase market power or hurt the consumer; it is purely a
way for ﬁrms to increase proﬁts by smoothing shocks. Consumers neither
gain nor lose on average, since total capacity installed is unchanged.
5 Repeated Games With a Capacity Exchange
The results thus far hold in a conventional one-shot model. We now examine
whether the exchange will be less eﬃcient in a repeated game setting.
Tacit collusion with trading potentially involves two eﬀects: coordination
on stage 1 capacities and coordination on trading in the exchange in stage
2. Strategies to punish defection also involve two potential eﬀects: in the
event of defection, ﬁrms could alter stage 1 capacities or alter their stage 2
trading quantitities, or both.
To narrow this large set of problems, we focus on cooridnation and pun-
ishments involving stage 1 capacities. Exchange behavior continues to be
price-taking (and therefore eﬃcient), so colluding ﬁrms have no collective
incentive to alter exchange behavior (because no improvement is possible).
The entire game, stages 1-3, is repeated inﬁnitely and all actions of all
ﬁrms are perfectly observable. The simplest form of tacit collusion relies on
13a trigger strategy equilibrium (Friedman 1971). All ﬁrms install a collusive
capacity in stage 1, then trade as in Section 4 in stage 2, and sell to customers
in stage 3. If any ﬁrm tries to cheat on this equilibrium path, then all ﬁrms
revert to Nash behavior forever.
Martin (2002) presents a nice textbook treatment of this type of repeated
game and shows that cooperation is sustainable as long as the period-to-




payoﬀ to defecting − payoﬀ to colluding
payoﬀ to colluding − Nash payoﬀ
(9)
where each of the payoﬀs occurs in just one repetition of the game. We now
ﬁnd these payoﬀs for our model.
Section 4 discussed how the Nash payoﬀs are similar in the trading and
no-trading cases but for the addition of a constant (equation (8)). The





E(ΠNT) = (α − βk − γNk)k − ck
The solution is kNT
COL = α−c
2β+2γN, with a corresponding expected proﬁt E(ΠNT
COL).
With trading, ﬁrms jointly maximize expected proﬁts given by (7). Since
all ﬁrms are identical before the demand shocks are realized, the collusive
quantity is the same for each ﬁrm. Rewriting (7) with k = k gives the
14collusive maximization problem with trading:
max
k




By inspection, this is the same as the no-trading problem except for the
addition of a constant; hence the collusive quantity is the same with or
without the exchange. Thus, we denote the collusive quantity by kCOL
either with or without trading, and we ﬁnd that the diﬀerence between the







Since both the collusive and Nash payoﬀs only diﬀer by a constant which
cancels in the denominator of (9), the change in interest rates that support
tacit collusion is determined entirely by the defection payoﬀ in the numer-
ator. Comparing the defection capacities under the two regimes leads to a
surprising result:
Proposition 2 The defection capacity under trading is greater than the de-
fection capacity without trading: kT
DEF > kNT
DEF.
The intuition behind this result is that the payoﬀs to defection are dif-
ferent under the diﬀerent regimes. Without trading, ﬁrm j maximizes (3)
for the case where it chooses kj while all other ﬁrms choose kCOL. First de-
ﬁne kDEF =
kj+(N−1)kCOL
N as the industry average capacity when all ﬁrms




(α − (β + γN)kDEF)kj + β(kDEF − kj)kj − ckj
Defection under trading is more complicated because it involves two ef-
fects. First, as in any collusion model, the defecting ﬁrm gains market share
while suﬀering only a small decline in price. Second, the defecting ﬁrm has
more capacity than the others, so it tends to sell capacity in the exchange.
These sales are proﬁtable and augment the incentive for a defecting ﬁrm to








The trading maximization problem is diﬀerent because trading allows
the defecting ﬁrm to gain market share but mute the price-reducing eﬀect
on its own price. It does this by selling some of the extra capacity to other
ﬁrms, which spreads the price-reduction to each of the ﬁrms. In essence,
trading allows the defector to gain all the beneﬁts of cheating but force
some of the costs onto the other ﬁrms.
Mathematically, the diﬀerence is in the second terms of the objective
functions. Without trading, the defecting ﬁrm suﬀers the full eﬀect of its
defection capacity, but with trading, it suﬀers only to the extent that it
raises the industry average capacity. Thus, defection proﬁts must be higher
16under trading than they are without trading, even net of the constant term.
This implies:
Proposition 3 Tacit collusion can be sustained at higher interest rates
without trading than with trading.
6 Conclusion
Capacity exchanges have an obvious beneﬁt since they allow ﬁrms to smooth
ﬁrm-speciﬁc demand shocks. At the same time, they may give the ap-
pearance of fostering collusion among competing ﬁrms. We showed that
in a static game, the exchange does raise ﬁrm proﬁts and does not beneﬁt
consumers on average, but neither does it increase market power. When
this game is repeated, we showed that the exchange actually has a pro-
competitive eﬀect in the sense that it may disrupt tacit collusion. Thus,
there is a countervailing force in capacity exchanges that works against any
tacit collusion that may come from information and communication.
It is important to recognize that ﬁrms may not behave as perfect com-
petitors in capacity exchanges. In this case, our eﬃciency results would be
diluted. Strategic bidding would make the exchange less eﬃcient and lower
the ﬁrms’ proﬁts. But we believe that strategic bidding in the exchange
cannot increase average prices in the retail market as long as all capacity
17must be sold eventually.
There are many possible extensions to the tacit collusion model. For
example, the punishment for defecting could come entirely through the ex-
change itself rather than changes in physical capacity. Also, not all variables
may be perfectly observable, in which case the exchange could facilitate col-
lusion by providing information. Then the pro-competitive eﬃciency eﬀect
in this paper would have to be traded oﬀ against the anti-competitive infor-
mation eﬀect.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: The price in the exchange is determined by the





































= ˆ Aj + Bjj + Dj
P ˆ Dii − kj
18This gives the trading curve. The ﬁrm’s capacity after trading is
q∗
j = δj(s∗) + kj
Given these trades, the retail price is:
p∗




















Then the operating proﬁt, net of the trading costs, is found by several





= ˆ Aj ˆ Fj − ( ˆ Aj − kj)
 





ˆ Aj ˆ Gj + Bj ˆ Fj − Bj
 








ˆ AjDjHj + Dj ˆ Fj − Dj
 
ˆ Aj − Aj
Dj
!












When we take the expected value of this operating proﬁt, we can use the
i.i.d. assumption to simplify the above. In particular, we have E(j) = 0,
19E(ij) = 0∀i 6= j, and E(2
j) = σ2. Then:
E(πj) = ˆ Aj ˆ Fj − ( ˆ Aj − kj)
 










This is equal to a constant plus a collection of terms multiplied by the
variance, hence we can write it
E(πj) = ˜ Aj + ˜ Bjσ2



























γN2 + 3γ − 3γN − γN−1 > 0
N(N − 3) + (3 − N−1) > 0
20This holds for any N > 1, proving the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 3: We want to show that the defection payoﬀ is higher
under trading. Suppose ﬁrm j played kNT






DEF + (N − 1)kCOL
N
the second term in the proﬁt function would be greater in the trading case
than the non-trading case. So playing the suboptimal strategy kNT
DEF would
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